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Interpreting Liberty and Equality 
Through the Lens of Marriage 
Nan D. Hunter* 
Would a master painting be worth as much if it were mounted inside a 
cheap and ugly frame? Of course—one would simply replace the frame with 
one that matched the artistic sensibility and value of the painting. What if it 
was not the frame that demeaned the visual aesthetic but a lens that distorted 
the artist’s work? Imagine that this lens was affixed to the painting, so that one 
could view the painting only through the lens. This possibility is more 
troubling. If the lens is permanent, the painting would no longer be worth as 
much because the distortion caused by the lens would have altered the meaning 
and experience of the painting. 
Reading Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges1 
left me with a similar queasy feeling about the right of same sex couples to 
marry.2 The opinion repeatedly emphasizes those aspects of marriage that are 
both the most idealized and the most constraining. The opinion’s discussion of 
marriage moves far beyond a right to gain access to an important government 
structure for recognition and benefits, to the point of invoking the fear that 
without marriage, one will be “condemned to live in loneliness.”3 Is marriage 
equality the frame for an important step forward at least for formal equality 
under the law or has the Supreme Court’s decision bowdlerized the message of 
equality with its distorting lens? If, as is most likely, the answer is both, how 
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 1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 2. Id. at 2605. 
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difficult will this lens be to dislodge and for how long? I argue in this Essay 
that Obergefell elevates traditionalist concepts of marriage over principles of 
liberty or equality. It reproduces a jurisprudence that frames access to a state-
created status, which should be open to all, as a reward for adherence to a 
narrow social meaning of marriage. Using the power of law and invoking 
liberty and equality, the Court forces open an exclusionary institution, but as a 
cultural message of support for greater human freedom, the opinion seems 
conflicted. Moreover, at the level of doctrine, it generates greater uncertainty 
for other courts in applying equal protection analysis and dealing with intimate 
relationships outside marriage. 
The freedom to marry for same-sex couples has always drawn criticism 
from opposite political poles as either too conservative in its ambitions or too 
destabilizing in its consequences. There is nothing new here. A right to equal 
treatment often grows from an outsider’s claim to participate in a 
fundamentally assimilationist institution, as is demonstrated by the history of 
challenges to exclusion from practices associated with citizenship, whether 
public education or military service. Voting is so prosaic that half of Americans 
who could vote regularly do not,4 yet the rights of African-Americans and 
women to vote were once radical claims; suffrage for women is still less than 
100 years old. And although voting is insufficient to secure full social 
citizenship and economic participation, it is nonetheless necessary. One hopes 
that we will one day say the same about sexual citizenship, that achieving equal 
access to marriage was a necessary step to a deeper understanding of sexuality 
as a human right and a central component of human flourishing. If, as the Court 
says, marriage is “the keystone of our social order,”5 then further disconnecting 
it from mechanisms of subordination would be something to celebrate. 
Yet seldom has the theme of joining rather than challenging an institution 
been as central as it was in the same-sex marriage campaign.6 This theme 
provided Justice Kennedy with the linchpin of his opinion: “[I]t is the enduring 
importance of marriage that is their whole point. [Plaintiffs are motivated by] 
their respect—and need—for its privileges and responsibilities.”7 The tone 
sounds vaguely apologetic, and one imagines Justice Kennedy in conversation 
with fellow conservatives, seeking to downplay and justify the result. He surely 
 
 4. Thom File, Who Votes? Congressional Elections and the American Electorate: 1978-
2014, U.S. Census (July 2015) at 3 (Table 1) (available at https://www.census.gov/content/dam/ 
Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p20-577.pdf [http://perma.cc/VPM2-63N9]). 
 5. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct  at 2601. 
 6. See generally FREEDOM TO MARRY, MOVING MARRIAGE FORWARD: BUILDING 
MAJORITY SUPPORT FOR MARRIAGE 6 (2011) (“[G]ay couples want to join marriage not ‘change’ 
it . . . because they respect the institution and what it means in our society, and because they believe in 
the values of marriage and what it can bring: commitment, happiness, responsibility, companionship, 
family connectedness, and support and help in caring for those we love.”), 
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/page/-/files/pdfs/Moving%20Marriage%20Forward.pdf 
[http://www.perma.cc/53ZR-B5EG]. 
 7. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594. 
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has the discretion to write in this register, and doing so may be strategically 
adept. But as political philosophy, the opinion is scattershot at best. It swerves 
between the classically liberal concept of self-determination, a gesture toward 
Rawlsian justice,8 and a neoliberal commitment to privatizing the risk of 
material insecurity through the mechanism of expanding private, family-based 
responsibility. 
I. 
THE ROLE OF DIGNITY 
Obergefell’s center of gravity is the concept of dignity. The Court 
catalogs the ways in which same-sex couples measure up to the ideals of 
“nobility and dignity”9 embodied in the institution of marriage. Not only are 
LGBT Americans as devoted to partners and children as heterosexuals, but we 
also “aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage and seek fulfillment in its 
highest meaning.”10 Exactly what these lofty phrases mean is anyone’s guess. It 
certainly sounds, though, that, like the deserving poor, the deserving queer 
have earned this recognition by pledging allegiance to a particular cultural flag 
and the norms for which it stands. 
Where does that leave the presumptively un-deserving (poor or queer or 
both)? The Court in Obergefell reasons that marriage serves the same functions 
for lesbian and gay couples as for different-sex couples, and inequality in 
access to marriage is wrong. Does the case also stand for the proposition that 
inequality is wrong because we are equally worthy of access? The opinion 
creates a disturbing sense of contingency, the implication that the dignity rights 
at issue flow less from the bedrock of human rights than from the respectability 
of both the particular institution and the particular plaintiffs whose moral worth 
render them eligible to participate in it. Dignity is a slippery concept, and it is 
too soon to know whether it will figure significantly in U.S. constitutional 
law.11 It is instructive, however, to compare the use of “dignity” in Obergefell 
and Windsor, an earlier Justice Kennedy decision concerning federal 
recognition of same-sex marriage,12 to the role dignity plays in the law of other 
nations where the right is explicitly found in constitutional text. In the same-
 
 8. John Rawls conceived of justice as the maximization of both liberty and equality, 
exemplified by principles flowing from “the veil of ignorance,” in which the test of justice would be 
whether an individual would agree to be governed by a given policy without knowing her position in 
society. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118–19 (rev. ed. 1999). See also, Leif Wenar, “John 
Rawls”, Para. 4, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), (available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rawls/#JusFaiJusWitLibSoc 
[http://perma.cc/NSM5-HUUG]). 
 9. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct  at 2594. 
 10. Id. at 2602. 
 11. For a comparative analysis, see Luis Roberto Barroso, Here, There, and Everywhere: 
Human Dignity in Contemporary Law and in Transnational Discourse, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 331 (2012). 
 12. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689, 2692, 2694, 2696 (2013). 
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sex marriage decision from the Constitutional Court of South Africa,13 for 
example, dignity is intrinsic to the person and all family forms. In the view of 
that court, the state does not confer dignity by granting marriage rights; rather it 
is compelled to recognize the strong link between dignity and equality.14 
In Obergefell, marriage and dignity are fused, and marital dignity 
functions as a mediating institution. The bonds of marriage enable “two 
persons together [to] find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and 
spirituality.”15 There is an “abiding connection between marriage and 
liberty,”16 and marriage appears to ennoble this liberty. It is a “two-person 
union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals.”17 The 
opinion leaves no doubt that this is a quid pro quo: “[J]ust as a couple vows to 
support each other, so does society pledge to support the couple.”18 
In fairness to the Justices, they were struggling with how to analyze an 
institution of densely packed social meaning. Perhaps one reason for the 
overblown language of the opinion is an impulse to deflect attention from the 
historical association of marriage not only with commitment and children, but 
also with sexuality. The words “dignity” and “sexuality” do not usually appear 
in the same sentence. Consciously or not, the Court uses the language of 
dignity in ways that occlude the physical intimacy dimensions of what is at 
stake, even though, until relatively recently, marriage was the only social 
location in which sexual activity was lawful. An alternative concept of dignity 
more infused with democratic and pluralist values could encompass respect for 
variation in kinship, sexuality, and affiliation. The moralistic version of dignity 
in Obergefell does not. 
Yet, norms of sexual practice will remain dynamic despite the extent to 
which they are hidden or legitimized by marriage. When sex was legal only 
between spouses and marriage was coterminous with heterosexuality, any and 
all of the sexual practices of same-sex partners were intrinsically transgressive. 
Acquiring the option to marry will not eliminate extra-marital liaisons by same-
sex partners any more than it has for different-sex couples. Indeed, there is 
evidence that the custom of multiple partners is especially common among 
male couples.19 In sexual liberty terms, what same-sex couples have acquired is 
 
 13. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, [2005] ZACC 19. 
 14. Id. at para. 78, 79. 
 15. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 2601. 
 19. Colleen C. Hoff et al., Relationship Characteristics Associated with Sexual Risk Behavior 
Among MSM in Committed Relationships, 26 AIDS PATIENT CARE & STDS 738, 741 (2012) 
(reporting that 55 percent of the 566 gay male couples studied had agreed to an open relationship); 
Nan D. Hunter, Introduction: The Future Impact of Same-Sex Marriage: More Questions Than 
Answers, 100 GEO. L. J. 1855, 1867 (2012). 
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the option that heterosexual couples have long had: to act as if sexuality is 
contained within marriage. 
Most people would consider the implicit agreement to participate in the 
performance of monogamy as discursive theater—a representation which could 
be accurate or not, at any given time, for any given couple—as a small price to 
pay for equality under law. Some LGBT rights advocates prioritized equal 
marriage rights in part because the extraordinary degree of resistance to their 
arguments seemed to signal that if gays and lesbians were found equal for 
purposes of this institution, then eliminating other barriers to equality would 
seem like a mop-up operation. Admittedly, it might take a few years to iron out 
all the wrinkles in the fabric of equality, but there would be no doubt as to the 
outcome. The degree of judgmentalism in the opinion, however, illuminates 
serious flaws in the proposition that equal marriage will raise all boats. 
II. 
A RIGHT NOT TO MARRY? 
The Obergefell Court concludes that same-sex partners who wish to marry 
are entitled to “equal dignity in the eyes of the law.”20 But the logic of the 
opinion raises the obvious question of how much dignity should attach to 
individuals who choose not to marry. The Court describes an individual’s 
choices regarding marriage as central to autonomy because they “shape an 
individual’s destiny.”21 A right to marry that is so central to personhood must 
entail a commensurate right not to marry. Every important liberty is a Janus-
like construct: absent extraordinary and urgent conditions, there are always two 
equal sides. One has the liberty to speak or not to speak. One has the right to 
bear or beget a child, or not. Americans can travel at will, but cannot be 
forcibly relocated. So too, not-marriage as a negative liberty right must be 
fundamental. 
Less clear is the fate of policies that affirmatively advantage or favor 
married persons over the unmarried. In demographic terms, not-marriage is 
growing in significance as both a status, whether temporary or permanent, and 
a choice. Of Americans aged 25 to 44, almost a third are either single or 
divorced.22 There are two dimensions to the right not to marry. Not-marriage 
(like marriage) may coincide with sexual practices that implicate questions of 
constitutional protection for conduct.23 In addition and independently of the 
question of conduct, constitutional questions arise concerning protection for 
 
 20. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608. 
 21. Id.. at 2599. 
 22. See Hunter, supra note 19, at 1860 (“Of American women in the prime marrying ages of 
twenty-five to forty-four, more than 40% were either divorced (13%), cohabiting (11%), or single 
(18%).”). 
 23. See infra notes 40–42; see also Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1 (2012) (discussing the history of marriage and how the institution serves as “a vehicle of state-
imposed sexual discipline”). 
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unmarried status. Individuals who could have married but chose not to may 
challenge the validity of government policies that favor similarly situated 
persons who chose to marry. Ironically, their grounds for doing so may be 
stronger after Obergefell. 
III. 
UNRESOLVED CHALLENGES POST-OBERGEFELL 
Having won the right to marry, the LGBT rights movement will face the 
same question as other social justice movements: Is formal equality or liberty 
enough? The question today for the LGBT rights movement is how it will 
deploy the resources that it mobilized for marriage equality. One option is that 
organizations will continue to prioritize other formal equality goals, such as 
enactment of federal and state laws that explicitly prohibit sexual orientation 
discrimination. Protection from discrimination in the ordinary transactions of 
daily life—on the job, in housing or in public accommodations—is surely 
important. Equally important, however, are issues that arise from the bottom up 
and have a disproportionate impact on less advantaged portions of the LGBT 
population. 
For economically marginal groups within the LGBT community, the daily 
operations of law enforcement agencies continue to re-inscribe subordination. 
A study by the Center for Gender and Sexuality Studies at Columbia Law 
School reported that 73 percent of a sample of LGBT people and people living 
with HIV had face-to-face contact with police during a five-year period.24 Of 
that group, five percent had been incarcerated, compared to three percent of the 
U.S. adult population.25 One reason, the report argued, is that “transgender 
women of color and LGBT youth of color are endemically profiled as being 
engaged in sex work, public lewdness, or other sexual offenses.”26 Other 
studies also document a disproportionate association between race, gender 
identity, or sexual orientation, and police harassment, especially in the context 
of sex work.27 
 
 24. CATHERINE HANSSENS ET AL., A ROADMAP FOR CHANGE: FEDERAL POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDRESSING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF LGBT PEOPLE AND PEOPLE 
LIVING WITH HIV 4 (2014), http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gender-
sexuality/files/roadmap_for_change_full_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/NGL8-53J9]. 
 25. Id. at 5. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See, e.g., Elijah Adiv Edelman, “This Area Has Been Declared a Prostitution Free Zone”: 
Discursive Formations of Space, the State, and Trans “Sex Worker” Bodies, 58 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 
848 (2011); Lydia A. Sausa et al., Perceived Risks and Benefits of Sex Work Among Transgender 
Women of Color in San Francisco, 36 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 768 (2007). 
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IV. 
HOW STRONG THE EQUALITY? 
In addition to the strategic questions related to movement priorities, two 
major questions of law remain unsettled. For all its rhetorical fireworks, 
Obergefell does little to clarify the scope of either the liberty or equality 
principles on which it is based. The right to marry is a classic equal liberty 
claim, a hybrid of the fundamental right to marry and the exclusion of a class of 
couples in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. In the closest analogous 
case, Loving v. Virginia,28 the Court struck down a state ban on interracial 
marriage in an opinion much more heavily grounded in an Equal Protection 
analysis than Obergefell. Loving contains two short paragraphs on liberty, 
treating it as almost an afterthought, a brief recognition that the parties, whose 
primary claim rested in the Equal Protection Clause, also had a liberty-based 
right to marry.29 Plaintiffs’ lawyers in Obergefell had hoped to win a similar 
Equal Protection victory, ideally organized along the principles of heightened 
scrutiny. 
The Court chose a different path in Obergefell, however. It recognized 
both liberty and equality grounds for its holding, but the equality portion of the 
analysis reads as the weaker of the two. Equality is not so obviously the 
tagalong in Obergefell that liberty was in Loving, but its scope is unclear. 
Throughout its discussion of equal protection, Obergefell references the 
equality issue nested within a right to liberty, stating for example that “[i]t was 
the essential nature of the marriage right [in Zablocki v. Redhail30] that made 
apparent the law’s incompatibility with requirements of equality.”31 But how 
strong will the Court’s commitment to equality be when there is no 
fundamental liberty involved to make apparent the inequality of a sexual 
orientation classification? The Court does not answer that question. 
Remarkably, the section of the opinion addressing equality contains no citation 
to Romer v. Evans, the only Supreme Court case involving LGBT persons that 
was squarely decided on Equal Protection grounds.32 Nor is there any 
discussion of the tiers of review that have traditionally been necessary to an 
analysis under the Equal Protection Clause. 
The absence of tiers may simply signal the declining use of an overly 
mechanistic structure in a calculus that would more appropriately turn on 
questions related to proportionality. Identifying whether a law imposes a 
burden that is disproportionate to its likely benefit would offer a more sensible 
 
 28. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 29. Id. at 12. 
 30. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 31. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015). 
 32. 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996). But cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) 
(“DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty . . . protected by the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause.”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574–75 (2003) (declining to declare the 
Texas statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause). 
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approach than remaining stuck in the criteria for heightened scrutiny. The 
underlying principle that greater burdens require more persuasive justifications 
provides one of the anchors of constitutional jurisprudence.33 Review of 
classifications that are odious but have not been found suspect provides an 
obvious opportunity for the Court to expand on its use of this principle. 
Instead, the opinion lacks a meaningful equal protection analysis despite 
its holding that the Equal Protection Clause had been violated. This omission 
will produce uncertainty. We know from the context of reproductive rights that 
while the state cannot block the exercise of a fundamental right, it can engage 
in negative action, such as condemnation, to discourage it. Since Maher v. 
Roe,34 the Supreme Court has imposed “no limitation on the authority of a State 
to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement 
that judgment by the allocation of public funds.”35 The same principle could 
apply to sexual orientation issues. For example, Alabama requires that public 
school sex education curricula “emphasize . . . that homosexuality is not a 
lifestyle acceptable to the general public.”36 There is no liberty right to non-
pejorative or even accurate schoolbooks, and one can imagine that some state 
legislatures or school boards might cling to the message that homosexuality is 
immoral, even if same-sex couples can marry. The gaps in the equal protection 
analysis in Obergefell may allow states to continue adopting policies that 
attempt to shame lesbians and gay men who exercise their right to marry. 
V. 
HOW CAPACIOUS THE LIBERTY? 
The second unanswered doctrinal question is how far the liberty right will 
extend to protect intimate relationships other than marriage. Put another way, 
what is the scope of liberty for couples gay or straight who could marry but 
choose not to and for those in intimate relationships that involve more than two 
persons? The Constitutional Court of South Africa joined the right of same-sex 
couples to marry with a “right to be different,” noting “South Africa has a 
multitude of family formations that are evolving rapidly as our society 
develops, so that it is inappropriate to entrench any particular form as the only 
socially and legally acceptable one.”37 
In the United States, there is well-established doctrine, though relatively 
little case law, on a right to intimate association that is exemplified by familial, 
 
 33. In the realm of equal protection, for example, the Court has developed a concept of 
“proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved” in 
assessing whether Congress has exceeded its authority in enacting remedial legislation. The State must 
demonstrate a compelling government interest and show that the law is the least restrictive means of 
furthering its interest. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533–34 (1997). 
 34. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
 35. Id. at 474. 
 36. ALA. CODE 1975 § 16-40A-2(c)(8). 
 37. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, [2005] ZACC 19, at para. 59. 
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but not necessarily marriage-based, relationships.38 The Supreme Court has 
described the prototype of intimate association as relationships that involve 
“deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals 
with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, 
and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.”39 Cases 
brought on this ground have often involved plaintiffs who were fired from 
public sector jobs, frequently in law enforcement, for beginning romantic 
relationships with co-workers or offenders in violation of agency policies.40 It 
is unclear how the liberty right recognized in Obergefell will interact with 
government policies that ban or impose penalties for intimate associations in 
workplace or other settings. 
Additional challenges to laws that restrict liberty within the zone of 
intimate association seem inevitable. Recently, fundamentalist Mormons in 
Utah brought a case, now pending in the Tenth Circuit, to assert that they 
engage in “religious cohabitation” in violation of a statute that prohibits 
cohabitation as well as polygamy.41 Plaintiffs in this case are not challenging 
the validity of the prohibition on bigamy, but claim a right to live as they wish 
so long as they do not seek the recognition of marriage. The district court found 
no fundamental right to religious cohabitation, but struck down the statute 
under rational basis review as a restriction on liberty in light of Lawrence, in 
part because the State did not prosecute persons for adultery or “religiously 
motivated polygamy.”42 
 
 38. See Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619–20 (1984) (“[T]he relationships that might be 
entitled to . . . constitutional protection are those that . . . attend the creation and sustenance of a 
family.”). 
 39. Id. at 620. 
 40. See, e.g., Bautista v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 190 Cal. App. 4th 869 (2010) (alleging that 
termination for engaging in a personal relationship with a prostitute violated plaintiff’s right to 
freedom of association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Isenbart v. Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs, No. 11-cv-03240-LTB-BNB, 2012 WL 4378269 (D. Col. Sept. 25, 2012) (alleging 
termination as a result of entering into an “intimate dating, marital, and familial relationship” with 
another county employee); Via v. Taylor, 224 F. Supp. 2d 753 (D. Del. 2002) (alleging wrongful 
termination resulting from correctional officer’s off-duty relationship with paroled former inmate); 
Cross v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t., 213 Md. App. 294 (2013) (arguing that plaintiff was terminated 
in violation of her constitutional right to marry and to engage in intimate association); Briggs v. N. 
Muskegon Police Dep’t, 563 F. Supp. 585 (W.D. Mich. 1983), aff’d without opinion, 746 F.2d 1475 
(6th Cir. 1984) (alleging that plaintiff was dismissed from his job as a part-time city police officer for 
cohabiting with a married woman who was not his wife); Corso v. Fisher, 983 F. Supp. 2d 320 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (alleging that New York City’s Department of Corrections policy prohibiting 
personal association of agency employees with current and former inmates and their associates 
violated the First Amendment). Other cases involve firing a public employee based on a spouse’s 
actions. Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 1999) (alleging his discharge in retaliation for lawsuit 
filed by wife violated his First Amendment rights); Sanitation & Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of New 
York, 107 F.3d 985 (2d Cir. 1997) (challenging local law on grounds that it unconstitutionally 
infringed on right of association). 
 41. Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1178, 1181 (D. Utah 2013) (appeal pending). 
 42. Id. at 1224. 
116 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  6:107 
CONCLUSION 
One lesson from Obergefell is clear: those who thought that a ruling on 
same-sex marriage would be the final word from the Supreme Court on the 
limits of state regulation of sexuality must reconsider. There is surely more to 
come and more that needs to be done, especially on behalf of those whose 
sexual practices or intimate relationships fall outside the penumbra of 
respectability that Obergefell celebrates. “The nature of injustice is such that 
we may not always see it in our own times.”43 
 
 43. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015). 
